

The Prince

[Handwritten manuscript page showing musical notation on staves.]

From the translation by Peter Bondanella, Oxford World's Classics, 2005.

5, 7, 9

9, 7, 6, 12, 21

+ lexicon of servitude

umbrella term
for any type
of ruler/leader

DEDICATORY LETTER

Niccolò Machiavelli to
the Magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici

Sogliono el più delle volte

gran diligenza

grazia

education
& consistency
(≠ arrogance
& stupidity)

vostra Magnificenza

della servitù mia

con una lunga
esperienza delle
cose moderne

et una continua
lettione delle
antiche

tanti mia disagi
e pericoli

cf. rhetorics

"lenocinio"

≡ seduction

(// prostitution:

LENOCINIUM
in ancient Rome)

metaphor of
the painter

⇒ PERSPECTIVE

⇒ knowledge
through EFFECTS

① In most instances it is customary for those who desire to win the favour of a prince to present themselves to him along with those things which they value most or which they feel will most please him. Thus, we often see princes given horses, arms, and vestments of gold cloth, precious stones, and similar ornaments suited to their greatness. Wishing, therefore, to offer myself to Your Magnificence with some evidence of my devotion to you, I have not found among my belongings anything that I might value more or prize so much as the knowledge of the deeds of great men that I have learned from a long experience in modern affairs and a continuous study of antiquity. Having with great care and for a long time thought about and examined these deeds, and having now set them down in a little book, I am sending them to Your Magnificence. And although I consider this work unworthy of your station, nevertheless I am sure that your humanity will move you to accept it, for there could not be a greater gift from me than to give you the means to be able, in a very short time, to understand all that in so many years and with so many hardships and dangers I have come to understand and to appreciate. I have neither decorated nor filled this work with elaborate sentences, with rich and magnificent words, or with any other form of rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation that many writers normally use in describing and enriching their subject-matter, for I wished that nothing should set my work apart or make it pleasing except the variety of its material and the gravity of its contents. Neither do I wish that it be thought presumptuous if a man of low and inferior social condition dares to examine and lay down rules for the governance of princes. For just as those who paint landscapes place themselves in a low position on the plain in order to consider the nature of the mountains and the heights, and place themselves high on top of mountains in order to study the plains, in like manner, to know the nature of the people well one must be a prince, and to know the nature of princes well one must be of the people.

④ Accept, therefore, Your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit that I send it. If you read and consider it carefully, you will discover in it my most heartfelt desire that you may attain the greatness that Fortune and all your own qualities promise you. And if Your Magnificence will at some time turn your eyes from the summit of your high position toward these low places, you will realize to what degree I unjustly suffer a great and continuous malignity of Fortune.

una grande e continua malignità di fortuna

↳ cf. ch. VII → Cesare Borgia

- ① Offering of the gift = "a little book"
+ its subject-matter (the deeds of great men)
+ method and sources (modern affairs: 1498-1512 as Secretary to the Second Chancery of the Republic of Florence + study of Antiquity through the books of Greek and Roman historians, also the Bible, ...)

② Choosing a language → efficient and direct (style / content)

③ Placing oneself = dynamic realism (multiple perspectives)

④ Outro on the variations of Fortune.

→ principalities are states
 § 1: political form
 § 2: with a materiality
 § 3: → territory + history

brings forth an essential precision:
 states here are sovereign territories
 which power is founded on good laws and armies

How many kinds of principalities there are and the ways they are acquired

cf. XII

PLAN:

- a) republics/principalities
 - b) principalities: hereditary/new
 - c) the new ones: completely/mixed
 - d) accustomed to a prince/freedom
- cf. ch. II - XI

All states, ~~and~~ all dominions that have had and (continue to) have power over men, have been, and (still) are, either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, in which instance the family of the prince has ruled for generations, or they are new. The new ones are either completely new, as was Milan for Francesco Sforza, or they are like appendages added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as is the Kingdom of Naples for the King of Spain. Dominions taken in this way are either accustomed to living under a prince or are used to being free; and they are gained either by the arms of others or by one's own, either through Fortuna or through virtù.

- e) arms of others/one's own
 - f) fortuna/virtù
- cf. ch. XII - XIV
 cf. ch. XV - XXVI

o usi ad essere liberi.

Of hereditary principalities

ORIGINAL TITLE OF THE BOOK:

[De Principatibus]

Discourses on Livy
 (c. 1517)
 on which it was already working at the time of The Prince

I shall set aside any discussion of republics, because I have treated them at length elsewhere. I shall consider solely the principality, weaving together the threads mentioned above as I go, and I shall discuss how these principalities can be governed and maintained. "governare e mantenere"

- 1) Aim of the book
- discursive strategy of Machiavelli

I say, then, that in hereditary states accustomed to the rule of their prince's family, there are far fewer difficulties in maintaining them than in new states, for it is sufficient simply not to break ancient customs, and then to suit one's actions to unexpected events. In this way, if such a prince is of ordinary ability he will always maintain his state, unless some extraordinary and inordinate force should deprive him of it, and although it may be taken away from him, he will regain it at the slightest mistake of the usurper.

- 2) ARGUMENT on hereditary principalities
- "extraordinaria et excessiva"
 ⇒ fortuna

As an example, we have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara, who withstood the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and those of Pope Julius in 1510 for no other reason than his long-established rule in that dominion. Because a prince by birth has fewer reasons and less need to harm his subjects, it is natural that he should be more loved; and if no unusual vices make him hated, it is reasonable that he should be naturally well liked by them. And through the great length and continuity of his dominion the memories and causes of innovations die out, because one change always leaves indentations for the construction of another.

- 3) EXAMPLE
- two generations of Duke of Ferrara

* temporeggiare con gli accidenti = composer avec les imprévus

tempérer/temporiser

perché sempre una mutazione lascia lo adentellato per la edificazione dell'altra.
 (= dynamic realism)

XII: "And the principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old or the mixed, are good laws and good armies."

→ thus other form of states - e.g. tyrannical - are excluded, since they are not founded on good laws and good armies? cf. ch. VIII Agathocles

How to integrate diverse populations/institutions within one state (= body)

III

Of mixed principalities

[...]

in una provincia disforme di lingua,

di costumi
e di ordini

— gran fortuna
e grande
industria

↓
cleverness,
astuteness,
effort

decisiveness
→ virtù
// medicine

L'altro migliore remedio (cf. metaphor of the body)

Economy of
means:

- what are the costs?
 - who to injure?
 - how?
- // "chirurgical
stroke"?

General rule:
[either/or]

cf. ch. XVII

For a counter-
example

(the Florentine
wanted not to
appear cruel,
and thus did not
take the necessary
measures)

Extract 3

(C)

1°

cf. ch. II
"to govern
and to
maintain"
→ through TIME

2°

"entraves"

diviser pour
régner

3°

troops
and
colonies

economy

But when dominions are acquired in a region that is not similar in language, customs, and institutions, it is here that difficulties arise; and it is here that one needs much good luck and much diligence to hold on to them. One of the best and most efficacious remedies would be for the person who has taken possession of them to go there to live. This would make that possession more secure and durable; as happened with the Turk in Greece; for despite all the other methods he employed to retain that dominion, if he had not gone to live there it would have been impossible for him to hold on to it. By being on the spot, troubles are seen at their birth and can be quickly remedied; not being there, they are heard about after they have grown up and there is no longer any remedy. Moreover, the region would not be plundered by your own officers; the subjects would be pleased to have direct recourse to their prince; thus, those wishing to be good subjects have more reason to love him, and those wanting to be otherwise, more reason to fear him. Anyone who might wish to invade that dominion from abroad would be more hesitant; so that living right there, it is only with the greatest difficulty that the prince can lose it.

The other and better solution is to send colonies into one or two places, that will act as shackles on that state; for it is necessary that the prince either do this or maintain a large number of cavalry and infantry. Colonies do not cost much, and with little or no expense a prince can send and maintain them. In so doing he injures only those whose fields and houses have been taken away and given to the new inhabitants, who are only a small part of that dominion. Those he injures, finding themselves scattered and poor, can never be a threat to him; and all the others remain uninjured on the one hand, and because of this they should remain peaceful, and on the other hand are afraid of making a mistake, for fear that what happened to those who were dispossessed might happen to them. I conclude that these colonies are not expensive, they are more loyal, they are less injurious, and the offended can do no harm since they are poor and scattered (as I have said).

Concerning this, it should be noted that men must be either caressed or wiped out; because they will avenge minor injuries, but cannot do so for grave ones. Any harm done to a man must be of the kind that removes any fear of revenge. But by garrisoning troops there instead of colonies, one spends much more, being obliged to consume all the revenues of the state in standing guard, so that the gain turns into a loss; and far greater injury is committed, since the entire state is harmed by the army changing quarters from one place to another. Everybody resents this inconvenience, and everyone becomes the ruler's enemy; and these are enemies that can be harmful, since, although conquered, they remain in their own homes. And so, in every respect, this form of protection is as useless as the other kind, colonization, is useful.

[...]

[Juste avant ce passage:]

« Et celui qui les acquiert, s'il veut les tenir, doit avoir égard à deux choses: la première, que soit éteint le sang de leur ancien prince; l'autre, n'altérer ni leurs lois ni leurs impôts; tant et si bien qu'en un temps très bref, leur ancien principat ne forme avec eux qu'un seul corps [tutto uno corpo]. »

III Of mixed principalities

1511

40

2

[...] King Louis lost Lombardy, therefore, by not following any of the precepts observed by others who seized territories and wished to retain them. Nor is this in any sense a miracle, but very ordinary and to be expected. I spoke about this at Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen, when Valentino (as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called) was capturing the Romagna. When the Cardinal of Rouen told me that Italians understood little about warfare, I replied to him that the French understood little about statecraft, for if they had some understanding, they would not have permitted the Church to gain so much power. Experience has shown that the power of both the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and that her downfall has been brought about by the Church and by Spain. From this one can derive a general rule which rarely, if ever, fails: that anyone who is the cause of another becoming powerful comes to ruin himself; because that power has been brought about by him either through cunning or by force; and both of these two qualities are suspect to the one who has become powerful.

4

20

6

8

10

30

12

14

maxim

In 1500,
first travel of
Machiavelli
out of Italy.

1638

Louis + Anne

annulment

la Chiesa
= danger for
Italy
cf. ch. XI

con industria o con forza (cf. the fox and the lion, ch. XVIII)

cf. the annulment

of Louis XII's marriage

[with Jeanne de France (filie de Louis XI)

so that he could marry Anne de Bretagne]
by Alexander VI, in exchange for the
Duchy of Valentinois for his son.

imperio: good armies
& good laws (ch. XII)

* perché, dicendomi el cardinale di Roano che gli Italiani non si intendevano della guerra, io gli risposi che li Franzesi non si intendevano dello stato

Republics

V

How cities or principalities should be governed that lived by their own laws before they were occupied

(d)

When those states that are acquired, as I have said, are accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom, there are three methods of holding on to them: the first is to destroy them; the second is to go there in person to live; the third is to allow them to live with their own laws, forcing them to pay a tribute and creating an oligarchy there that will keep the state friendly toward you. For since such a government, having been set up by that prince, knows it cannot last without his friendship and power, it must do everything possible to maintain them. A city accustomed to living in freedom is more easily maintained through the means of its own citizens than in any other way, if you decide to preserve it.

As examples, there are the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by establishing oligarchies there; yet they lost them both. In order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, the Romans destroyed them and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece in almost the same manner as the Spartans held it, making it free and leaving it under its own laws, and they did not succeed. Thus, they were obliged to destroy many of the cities in that region in order to retain it. For in fact, there is no secure means of holding on to cities except by destroying them. Anyone who becomes master of a city accustomed to living in liberty and does not destroy it may expect to be destroyed by it, because such a city always has as a refuge in any rebellion the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, neither of which is ever forgotten either because of the passing of time or because of the bestowal of benefits. And it matters very little what one does or foresees, since if one does not separate or scatter the inhabitants, they will not forget that name or those institutions. Immediately, and in every instance, they will return to them, just as Pisa did after one hundred years of being held in servitude by the Florentines. However, when cities or regions are accustomed to living under a prince and his bloodline has been wiped out, being on the one hand accustomed to obedience and, on the other, not having their old prince and not being able to agree upon choosing another one from amongst themselves—yet not knowing how to live as free men—they are, as a result, hesitant in taking up arms, and a prince can win them over and assure himself of their support with greater ease. But in republics, greater vitality, greater hatred, and greater desire for revenge exist. The memory of ancient liberty does not and cannot allow them to rest, so that the most secure course is either to wipe them out or to go to live there.

1° conclusive remark

1° destroy
2° go there live
3° let be and graft/phagocyte
→ oligarchy that ensures stewardship

2° examples

3° explanation and reflection

→ idea-force

occupied by F.
1405-1434
→ 1500s onward

4. Another case to serve as contrast

!

Extract 5

1.18-21: perché sempre ha per refugio nella rebellione el nome della libertà e gli ordini antichi suoi, e quali ne per lunghezza di tempo ne per beneficii mai si dimenticano.

1.31-32: Ma nelle repubbliche è maggiore vita, maggiore odio, più desiderio di vendetta: ne gli lascia, ne può lasciare riposare la memoria della antica libertà; tale che la più sicura via è spegnerle, o abitarvi.

// Marx,
raising
awareness
→ class
consciousness

in republics, people have exerted power, and have a higher awareness thereof

e non la disfaccia

1 opportunit  ← opportunitas ← ob-portus : (facilement) abordable ← portare ← per (  travers)
 occasion ← occasio ← occido ← ob- cadere : (v riment) tuer
 /- cadere : (") tomber

VI

Of new principalities acquired
by one's own troops and virtue

uno uomo prudente

No one should wonder if, in speaking of principalities that are completely
 new as to their ruler and form of government, I cite the greatest examples. Since
 men almost always follow the paths trod by others, and proceed in their affairs by
imitation, although they are not fully able to stay on the path of others, nor to
 equal the virtue of those they imitate, a wise man should always enter those
paths trodden by great men, and imitate those who have been most excellent, so
 that if one's own virtue does not match theirs, at least it will have the smell of it.
 He should do as those prudent archers do who, aware of the strength of their
bow when the target at which they are aiming seems too distant, set their sights
much higher than the designated target, not in order to reach such a height with
 their arrow, but instead to be able, by aiming so high, to strike their target.

1. Why imitate?

la virt  del loro arco

I say, therefore, that in completely new principalities, where there is a new
 prince, greater or lesser difficulty in maintaining them exists according to the
 greater or lesser virtue of the person who acquires them. Because for a private
 citizen to become a prince presupposes virtue or Fortune, it appears that either
 the one or the other of these two things should partially mitigate many of the
 problems. Nevertheless, he who relies less upon Fortune has maintained his
position best. Matters are also facilitated when the prince, having no other
 dominions to govern, is constrained to come to live there in person.

2. Who to imitate (argument)

However, to come to those who have become princes by means of their own
 virtue and not because of Fortune, I say that the most outstanding are Moses,
Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and others of their kind. Although we should not discuss
Moses, since he was a mere executor of things he was ordered to do by God,
 nevertheless he must be admired at least for the grace that made him worthy of
speaking with God. Let us then consider Cyrus and the others who have acquired
 or founded kingdoms. You will find them all admirable; and if their deeds and
 their particular methods are considered, they will not appear different from those
 of Moses, who had so great a teacher. In examining their deeds and their lives,
 one can see that they received nothing from Fortune except opportunity, which
 gave them the material they could mould into whatever form they liked. Without
 that opportunity the strength of their spirit would have been exhausted, and
 without that strength, their opportunity would have come in vain.

3. Who to imitate (example + conclusion)

†

[...]

la occasione

→ la quale d te loro materia a potere introdurvi dentro quella forma
che posse loro : e senza quella occasione la virt  dello
 animo loro si sarebbe spenta, e senza quella virt 
 la occasione sarebbe venuta invano.

→ qui leur donna^(h) mati re [ ] pour pouvoir (y) introduire cette
 forme qui leur parut [bonne]

Cesare Borgia

VII

Of new principalities acquired with the arms of others and by Fortune

1° thesis
2 Those private citizens who become princes through Fortune alone do so with little effort, but to maintain their position they need a great deal. They encounter
3 no obstacles along their way, since they fly there, but all their problems arise once
4 they have arrived. And these are the men who have been granted a state either
5 because they have money, or because they enjoy the favour of him who grants it.
6 This occurred to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where
7 Darius set up rulers in order to hold these cities for his own security and glory. The
8 same thing happened to those emperors who came to power from being private
9 citizens by corrupting the soldiers.

2° argument
10 Such men depend solely upon two very uncertain and unstable things: the
11 will and the Fortune of him who granted them the state. But they do not know
12 how, and are unable, to maintain their position. They do not know how to hold
13 their state, since if men are not of great intelligence and virtue, it is not
14 reasonable that they should know how to command, having always lived as
15 private citizens. They are unable to do so, since they do not have forces that are
16 faithful and loyal to them. Besides, states that arise quickly, just like all the other
17 natural things that are born and grow rapidly, cannot have roots and branches
18 and will be wiped out by the first adverse weather. This occurs unless the men
19 who have suddenly become princes (as I have noted) possess such virtue that
20 they know how to prepare themselves rapidly to preserve what Fortune has
21 dropped into their laps, and to construct afterwards those foundations others
22 have laid before becoming princes.

3° examples
23 Regarding the two methods just mentioned for becoming a prince, by virtue
24 or by Fortune, I should like to offer two examples from recent memory: Francesco
25 Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco became Duke of Milan from his station as a
26 private citizen through appropriate methods and a great deal of virtue; and what
27 he acquired with a thousand hardships he maintained with little effort. On the
28 other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired the
29 state through the Fortune of his father, and when this was lost, he lost it; despite
30 the fact that he did everything and used every method that a prudent and
31 virtuous man ought to employ in order to root himself securely in those states
32 that the arms and Fortune of others had granted him. For (as was stated above),
33 anyone who does not lay his foundations beforehand can do so later only with the
34 greatest of virtue, although this is done with difficulty for the architect and danger
35 to the building. If, therefore, we consider all the Duke's achievements, we shall
36 see that he laid sturdy foundations for his future power. And I do not think it
37 useless to discuss them, since I would not know of any better precepts to give to a
38 new prince than the example of his deeds. If he did not profit from his methods it
39 was not his fault, but this arose from an extraordinary and extreme instance of
40 contrary Fortune.

[...]

grandi fondamenti alla futura potenza

non fu sua colpa, perché nacque da
una straordinaria et extrema
malignità di fortuna.

d. Dedicatory letter (M. about himself)

⇒ The difficulty of maintaining

difficultà

non aver
virtù
volontà e
fortuna

1° they do not know
two humours
cf. ch. 8

2° they are unable

how to grow?

→ virtù

1° Francesco Sforza
→ by virtù

2° Cesare Borgia
→ by fortuna

"mettere le barbe"
= to take root

→ and quickly
by virtù

this illustrates
Machiavelli's
hope (and
humaneness).

extract 7

Cesare Borgia,
Duke of Valentino

VII

Of new principalities acquired with the arms of
others and by Fortune

Senigaglia

[...]

Having wiped out these leaders, and having reduced their partisans to his allies, the Duke had laid very good foundations for his power, possessing all of the Romagna along with the Duchy of Urbino. More important, it appeared that he had befriended the Romagna and had won the support of all of its populace once the people began to taste the beneficial results of his rule. Because this matter is worth noting and being imitated by others, I do not want to pass over it. After the Duke had taken the Romagna and had found it governed by powerless rulers—more anxious to plunder their subjects than to correct them, and who had given them reason for disunity rather than unity, so that the entire territory was full of thefts, quarrels, and every other kind of insolence—he decided that if he wanted to make the region peaceful and obedient to his regal power, it would be necessary to give it good government. Therefore, he gave a cruel and unscrupulous man, Messer Remirro de Orco, the fullest authority there. In no time at all Remirro reduced the territory to a peaceful and united state, and in so doing, the Duke greatly increased his prestige. Afterwards, the Duke judged that such excessive authority was no longer required, since he feared that it might become odious, and in the middle of the territory he set up a civil tribunal with a very distinguished president, in which each city had its own advocate. Because he realized that the rigorous measures of the past had generated a certain amount of hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people and to win them completely over to his side he wanted to show that, if any form of cruelty had occurred, it did not originate from him but from the violent nature of his minister. Having found the occasion to do so, one morning at Cesena he had Messer Remirro's body laid out in two pieces on the piazza, with a block of wood and a bloody sword beside it. The ferocity of such a spectacle left that population satisfied and stupefied at the same time.

[...]

a clever trap:

everyone is part of the decision,
through legit representatives,
yet the decision is the Duke's
cf. ch. XVIII

politics = science of the effective

- + spectacle
- + capacity to observe, make decision, change course
- + ambiguity concerning the status of imitation
→ mirrors for princes

loyalty

Signori = impotent

Dopo iudicio il Duca non essere necessaria si eccessiva autorità

catharsis
→ theatre
(cf. Aristotle)

scapegoat

da essere da altri imitata = [mimesis]

buono governo

institution: civil tribunal

leaning towards HATE

La seule erreur de C.B. : avoir fait un mauvais choix lors de l'élection du nouveau pape vers Jubs II.

+ De ne pas avoir anticipé qu'il serait malade à ce moment-là (mais cela il le met au compte de l'imprévisible contre quoi la vertu ne peut rien)

Agathocles of Syracuse
361 - 289 BCE

latin: scelerata
italian: scelleratezze

VIII

Of those who have become princes
through wickedness

↳ cruelty + treachery
as a passion

[...]

tradimenti e crudeltà

One might well wonder how, after so many betrayals and cruelties, Agathocles and others like him could live for such a long time secure in their native cities and defend themselves from foreign enemies without being plotted against by their own citizens. Many others, employing cruel means, were unable to hold on to their state even in peaceful times, not to speak of the uncertain times of war. I believe that this depends on whether cruelty be badly or well used.

male usata
o bene usata
1° in a single stroke
2° when necessary
3° not continued

Those cruelties are well used (if it is permitted to speak well of evil) that are carried out in a single stroke, done out of necessity to protect oneself, and then are not continued, but are instead converted into the greatest possible benefits for the subjects. Those cruelties are badly used that, although few at the outset, increase with the passing of time instead of disappearing. Those who follow the first method can remedy their standing, both with God and with men, as Agathocles did; the others cannot possibly maintain their positions.

Hence it should be noted that, in conquering a state, its conqueror should weigh all the injurious things he must do and commit them all at once, so as not to have to repeat them every day. By not repeating them, he will be able to make men feel secure and win them over with the benefits he bestows upon them.

Anyone who does otherwise, either out of timidity or because of bad advice, is always obliged to keep his knife in his hand. Nor can he ever count upon his subjects, who, because of their recent and continuous injuries, cannot feel secure with him. Therefore, injuries should be inflicted all at once, for the less they are tasted, the less harm they do. However, benefits should be distributed a little at a time, so that they may be fully savoured. Above all, a prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no unforeseen event, either bad or good, may cause him to alter his course; for when difficulties arise in adverse conditions, you do not have time to resort to cruelty, and the good that you do will help you very little, since it will be judged a forced measure, and you will earn from it no gratitude whatsoever.

- e tutte farle
a uno tratto

- si debbono
fare tutte
insieme

→ consistency

→ an "economy" of
injuries and benefits

cruelty used with reason (= prudence),
not out of passion

// Aristotle's
golden mean

with God?
because in the end,
though using cruelty,
less people died and
the situation ends up
better...?

« On devient prince de deux autres façons,
qu'on ne peut attribuer en tout point
ou à la fortune ou à la vertu »

→ Ch. VIII par la scélératesse

Ch. IX par la faveur des autres citoyens (// République)

IX Of the civil principality

expression idiosyncrasique
au titre de Machiavelli,
oxymore qui semble surgir
du processus d'écriture
du livre (succession des chapitres)

But let us come to the second instance, when a private citizen becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness or any other intolerable violence, but with the favour of his fellow citizens. This can be called a civil principality, the acquisition of which neither depends completely upon virtue nor upon Fortune, but instead upon a fortunate astuteness. I maintain that one reaches this principedom either with the favour of the common people or with that of the nobility, since these two different humours are found in every body politic. They arise from the fact that the people do not wish to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles, while the nobles do desire to command and to oppress the people. From these two opposed appetites, there arises in cities one of three effects: a principality, liberty, or licence. A principality is brought about either by the common people or by the nobility, depending on which of the two parties has the opportunity. When the nobles see that they cannot resist the populace, they begin to support someone from among themselves, and make him prince in order to be able to satisfy their appetites under his protection. The common people as well, seeing that they cannot resist the nobility, give their support to one man so as to be defended by his authority.

= that is not necessary

astuzia fortunata

in ogni città

- 1° principato
- 2° libertà (Republic)
- 3° licenza (chaos?)

He who attains the principality with the help of the nobility maintains it with more difficulty than he who becomes prince with the help of the common people, for he finds himself a prince amidst many who feel themselves to be his equals, and because of this he can neither govern nor manage them as he wishes. But he who attains the principality through popular favour finds himself alone, and has around him either no one or very few who are not ready to obey him. Besides this, one cannot honestly satisfy the nobles without harming others, but the common people can certainly be satisfied. Their desire is more just than that of the nobles— the former want not to be oppressed, while the latter want to oppress. In addition, a prince can never make himself secure when the people are his enemy, because there are so many of them; he can make himself secure against the nobles, because they are so few. The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but with a hostile nobility, not only does he have to fear being abandoned, but also that they will oppose him. Since the nobles are more perceptive and cunning, they always have time to save themselves, seeking the favours of the side they believe will prevail. Furthermore, a prince must always live with the same common people, but he can easily do without the same nobles, having the power every day to make and unmake them, or to take away and restore their power as he sees fit.

onestà
onesto

più vedere
e più astuzia

[...]

reputazione loro

* theory of humours : (metaphor of the body) < people (popolo) → desire ne pas être commandé ni opprimé par les grands
nobility (grandi) → desire commander et opprimer le peuple

↳ cf. ch. III, 10 :

« talmente che in brevissimo tempo diventa con loro il principato antiquo tutto uno corpo. »

XI Of ecclesiastical principalities

Only ecclesiastical principalities now remain to be discussed. Concerning these, all the problems occur before they are acquired, since they are acquired either through virtue or through Fortune, and are maintained without one or the other. They are sustained by the ancient institutions of religion, which are so powerful and of such a quality that they keep their princes in power no matter how they act and live their lives. These princes alone have states and do not defend them; have subjects and do not govern them; and their states, though undefended, are never taken away from them; and their subjects, being ungoverned, show no concern, and do not think about severing their ties with them, nor are they able to. These principalities, then, are the only secure and successful ones. However, since they are protected by higher causes, that the human mind is unable to fathom, I shall not discuss them: being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to do so. Nevertheless, someone might ask me why it is that the Church, in temporal matters, has arrived at such power when, until the time of Alexander, the Italian powers— not just those who were the established rulers, but every baron and lord, no matter how weak— considered her temporal power as insignificant, and now a King of France trembles before it, and it has been able to throw him out of Italy and to ruin the Venetians. Although this situation may already be known, it does not seem superfluous to me to recall it in some detail.

substantati dalli ordini antiquati nella religione

→ repetitions
= derision, sarcasm?

M. is prudent: Leo X is then the pope (cf. end of the chapters: neology)

[...]

1492 - 1503

→ Alexander VI

Pius III 1503 → 1503 - 1513

Julius II

1513 - 1521

Leo X = Giovanni de' Medici, second son of Lorenzo

→ principalities for which there is nothing to do = uninteresting

→ in this chapter, M. does what he says: clever as a fox, knowing how to avoid traps — but as often, he is too clever and it gives him away

Discours, I, 12:

« Nous avons donc avec l'Eglise et avec les prêtres, nous autres Italiens, cette première obligation: être devenus sans religion et mauvais [di essere diventati senza religione e cattivi]; mais nous en avons aussi une autre, plus grande, qui est la seconde raison de notre ruine, et c'est que l'Eglise a maintenu et maintient cette province divisée [divisa]. Et au vrai aucune province ne fut jamais unie ou heureuse [unita o felice] si elle n'en vient pas à obéir, en tout point, à une république ou à un prince. »

XII

Of the various kinds of troops and mercenary soldiers

Having treated in detail all the characteristics of those principalities that I proposed to discuss at the beginning, and having considered, to some extent, the reasons for their success or failure, and having demonstrated the methods by which many have tried to acquire them and to maintain them, it remains for me now to speak in general terms of the kinds of offence and defence that can be adopted by each of the previously mentioned principalities.

We have said above that a prince must have laid firm foundations; otherwise he will necessarily come to ruin. And the principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old or the mixed, are good laws and good armies. Since good laws cannot exist where there are no good armies, and where good armies exist there must be good laws, I shall leave aside the arguments about laws and shall discuss the armed forces. *+ in 1513, armies are the hot topic!*

I say, then, that the armies with which a prince defends his state are made up of his own troops, or mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or of mixed troops. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince holds on to his state by means of mercenary armies, he will never be stable or secure. Mercenaries are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and disloyal. They are brave with their friends; with their enemies, they are cowards. They have no fear of God, and they keep no faith with men. Their ruin is deferred only so long as an attack is deferred. In peacetime you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies. The reason for this is that they have no other love nor other motive to keep them in the field than a meagre salary, which is not enough to make them want to die for you. They love being your soldiers when you are not waging war, but when war comes, they either flee or desert. This would require little effort to demonstrate, since the present ruin of Italy is caused by nothing other than its having relied on mercenary troops for a period of many years. These forces did, on occasion, help some to get ahead, and they appeared courageous in combat with other mercenaries. But when the invasion of the foreigner came, they showed themselves for what they were, and thus Charles, King of France, was permitted to take Italy with a piece of chalk. The man who said that our sins were the cause of this disaster spoke the truth; but they were not at all those sins he had in mind, but rather these I have recounted; and because they were the sins of princes, the princes in turn have suffered the punishment for them.

[...] If someone were to reply that anyone who bears arms will act in this manner, mercenary or not, I would answer that armies have to be commanded either by a prince or by a republic. The prince must go in person and perform the office of captain himself. A republic must send its own citizens, and when it sends one who does not turn out to be an able man, it must replace him. If he is capable, the republic must restrain him with laws so that he does not exceed his authority. We see from experience that only princes and republics armed with their own troops make very great progress, and that mercenaries cause nothing but damage. A republic armed with its own citizens is less likely to come under the rule of one of its citizens than a city armed with foreign soldiers.

[...]

summary of chapters I-XI

buone arme
good armies
↓
good laws
buone legge

con-
damnation

characteristics

cause,
purpose,
unfaltering
loyalty

cf. VI, 21
prophets' unarmed
always loose

Savonarola
the only sin
is to ignore that
good armies are
a necessity.

// "live there"

Extract 12

↳ Rome, Sparta
& the Swiss:
armed & free
↳ cavalry instead of infantry
↳ reputation
↳ stayed away from
danger

cf. Ordinanza, 1506: constitution of the Florentine militia
→ 1509, recapture of Pisa

"il faut bien
qu'il y ait"

arme propre
inutile e periculose

but you can
use them as
cannon
fodder then...
cf. Wagner

the anecdote...
1494
(attributed to)
Alexander VI

XIII

Of auxiliary, mixed, and citizen soldiers

"non conosce e mali quando nascono"
cf. III, 28 "perché conoscendo
disosto, il che non è dato se
non a uno prudente, e mali
che nascono in quello si
guariscono presto"

non è veramente savio

lack of
judgement

[...] And thus anyone who does not diagnose the ills when they arise in a principality is not really wise, and this talent is given to few men. If one looks for the first signs of the downfall of the Roman Empire it will be found to have begun with the hiring of the Goths as mercenaries. From that beginning the armed forces of the Roman Empire began to be weakened, and all the virtue taken away from it was given over to the Goths. *ad enervare = loose nerves*

I conclude, therefore, that without having one's own soldiers, no principality is safe. On the contrary, it is completely subject to Fortune, not having the virtue that defends it faithfully in adverse times. It was always the opinion and conviction of wise men, 'quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentie non sua vi nixa' ['that nothing is so unhealthy or unstable as the reputation for power that is not based upon one's own forces']. One's own soldiers are those composed either of subjects or of citizens or your own dependants; all others are either mercenaries or auxiliaries. The means of ordering one's own arms are easily discovered, if the methods followed by those four men I have cited above are examined, and if one observes how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized themselves. I take my stand entirely on such methods.

e tutta quella
virtù, che si
levava da lui,
si dava a loro.
=> personification
"the virtue that
got away from
it, gave
itself to them"

Tacitus,
Annals, 13.19

a' quali ordini al tutto mi rimetto.

je m'en remets en tout point à ces ordres-là.

Cesare Borgia
Hiero of Syracuse
David
Charles VII

arme proprie vs le arme di altri

III, 16 example of David, who "wished to meet the enemy [Goliath] with his own sling and his own knife", in order to "test his true worth"

armies // weapons

↳ "the weapons of others slide off your back, weigh you down, or tie you up."

the kingdom of France & the Swiss

III, 19 Louis XI "abolished the ordinance of the infantry and began to hire Swiss troops" → prestige to the Swiss, discredit for the French
⇒ "the French cavalry felt they could not win without them" → MORAL
→ sedition: Marignan 1515

XV

Of those things for which men, and particularly
princes, are praised or blamed

e modi e governi

PLAN OF THE
THIRD PART

Now, it remains to be considered what should be the methods and principles
of a prince in dealing with his subjects and allies. Because I know that many have
written about this, I am afraid that by writing about it again I shall be considered
presumptuous, especially since in discussing this material I depart from the
procedures of others. But since my intention is to write something useful for
anyone who understands it, it seemed more suitable for me to search after the
effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. Many writers have
imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to
exist in reality. For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one
ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done
achieves his downfall rather than his preservation. A man who wishes to profess
goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good.
Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn
how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to
necessity.

// intention //
+ method

andare dietro
alla verità
effettuale
della cosa
(in its wake)

infra tanti
che non
sono buoni
[pessimism]

immaginate / vere

+ perspective

"quello che si
astiene troppo
di usare il sub"
= hybrid

è necessario
essere tanto
prudente

[an evaluation of
MAJOR &
MINOR VICES

cf. ch. VIII
"done out
of necessity"

parla virtù / vizio

e sequendola

A reevaluation of the
value of virtues and
vices → from Christianity
to realistic State
rule.

Extract 14

* Onde è necessario, volendosi uno principe mantenere,
imparare a potere essere non buono et usarlo e non usarlo
secondo la necessità.

cf. dedicatory
letter

conscious of
his originality

cf. Plato?

REALISM
+ AMORALITY

cf. Dedicatory
Letter

the list!

per le condizioni
umane che non
lo consentono
[anthropology]

- ① virtuous generosity does not let itself be known
 ② public generosity necessitates "sumptuosità" which leads to ruin if maintained
 ③ perspective + time + necessity

sarebbe bene essere tenuto

liberale (≠ misero) → liberalità

XVI

Of generosity and miserliness

Abondinanco

Beginning, therefore, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say that it would be good to be considered generous. Nevertheless, generosity employed in such a way as to give you a reputation for it will injure you, because if it is employed virtuously and as one should employ it, it will not be recognized, and you will not avoid the infamy of its opposite. And so, if a prince wants to maintain his reputation for generosity among men, it is necessary for him not to neglect any possible means of sumptuous display; in so doing, such a prince will always use up all his resources in such displays, and will eventually be obliged, if he wishes to maintain his reputation for generosity, to burden the people with excessive taxes and to do all those things one does to procure money. This will begin to make him hateful to his subjects and, if he becomes impoverished, he will be held in low regard by everyone. As a consequence of this generosity of his, having injured the many and rewarded the few, he will feel the effects of any discontent and will vacillate at the first sign of danger; recognizing this and wishing to change his ways, he immediately incurs the infamy of being a miser. Therefore, a prince, being unable to use this virtue of generosity in a manner that will not harm himself if he is known for it, should, if he is wise, not concern himself about the reputation of being miserly. With time he will come to be considered more generous, once it is evident that, as a result of his parsimony, his income is sufficient, he can defend himself from anyone who wages war against him, and he can undertake enterprises without overburdening his people. In this way he appears as generous to all those from whom he takes nothing, who are countless, and as miserly to all those to whom he gives nothing, who are few.

①

la non fia conosciuta

mantenere (...)

el nome di liberale

sumptuosità

②

FRAILTY

from one extreme

to the other

→ HYBRIS

prudente

... col tempo...

LONG

TERM

③

perspective!

In our times we have not seen great deeds accomplished except by those who were considered miserly; the others were all wiped out. Although he made use of his reputation for generosity in order to gain the papacy, Pope Julius II then decided not to maintain this reputation, in order to be able to wage war. The present King of France has waged many wars without imposing extraordinary taxes on his subjects, only because his habitual parsimony has provided for the additional expenditures. If he had been considered generous, the present King of Spain would not have engaged in or successfully carried out so many enterprises. Therefore— in order not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious— a prince must consider it of little account if he incurs the reputation of being a miser, for this is one of those vices that enables him to rule. And if someone were to say: 'Caesar with his generosity achieved imperial power, and many others, because they were generous and known to be so, achieved very high positions', I would reply: You are either already a prince, or you are on the way to becoming one. In the first case such generosity is damaging; in the second, it is indeed necessary to be thought generous. Caesar was one of those who wanted to gain the principality of Rome; but if he had survived and had not moderated his expenditures after doing so, he would have destroyed the power he acquired. [...]

perché questo

è uno di quelli

vizi che lo

fanno regnare

...are' distrutto quello imperio.

Nel secondo, è bene necessario essere ed essere tenuto liberale

→ On the short term, it is impossible to get the reputation without spending a lot = without being generous.

POLITICAL AFFECTS

XVII

Of cruelty and mercy, and whether it is better to be loved than to be feared or the contrary

essere tenuto pietoso e non crudele

①

pieta

Turning to the other qualities mentioned above, let me say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel; nevertheless, he must take care not to use such mercy badly. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; nonetheless, this cruelty of his brought order to the Romagna, united it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. If we examine this carefully, we shall see that he was more merciful than the Florentine people, who allowed the destruction of Pistoia in order to avoid being considered cruel.

effectiveness of CB's cruelty ≠ counter-productive action (per fuggire il nome di crudele)

amato che temuto?

From this arises an argument: whether it is better to be loved than to be feared or the contrary. The answer is that one would like to be both one and the other. But since it is difficult to be both together, it is much safer to be feared than to be loved, when one of the two must be lacking. For one can generally say this about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain. While you work for their benefit they are completely yours, offering you their blood, their property, their lives, and their sons, as I said above, when the need to do so is far away. But when it draws nearer to you, they turn away. The prince who relies entirely upon their words comes to ruin, finding himself stripped naked of other preparations. For friendships acquired by a price and not by greatness and nobility of spirit are purchased but are not owned, and at the proper time cannot be spent. Men are less hesitant about injuring someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared, because love is held together by a chain of obligation that, since men are a wretched lot, is broken on every occasion for their own self-interest; but fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that will never abandon you.

1) argument
2) demo/justification
→ human characteristics
// mercenaries?
// short-term generosity

le amicizie

lo amore

il timore

per essere gli uomini tristi paura di pena

③

d. VII & XIX

A prince must nevertheless make himself feared in such a way that he will avoid hatred, even if he does not acquire love; since one can very easily be feared and yet not hated. This will always be the case when he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects, and from their women. If he must spill someone's blood, he should do this when there is proper justification and manifest cause. But above all else, he should abstain from seizing the property of others; for men forget the death of their father more quickly than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover, reasons for taking their property are never lacking, and he who begins to live by stealing always finds a reason for taking what belongs to others; reasons for spilling blood, on the other hand, are rarer and more fleeting.

→ actions & institutions dealt with human nature

avoid the passion for stealing // cruelty

④

Stoic conclusion

Let me conclude, then— returning to the issue of being feared and loved— that since men love at their own pleasure and fear at the pleasure of the prince, the wise prince should build his foundation upon that which is his own, not upon that which belongs to others: only he must seek to avoid being hated, as I have said.

cf. Epictetus, ENCHIRIDION §1 "Is it concerned with what is in our power or with what is not in our power?"

→ cf. ch. XIX & XX:

"the best fortress that exists is not to be hated by the people"

art of distinction cf. Plato's dogs

Extract 16

GRADATIONS:

timore (fear, crainte) → paura (dread, fear)

love paid for (+ generosity) → love acquired through one's deeds

what is not in our power?"

XVIII

How a prince should keep his word

How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with integrity and not by cunning, everyone knows. Nevertheless, one sees from experience in our times that the princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have thought little about keeping faith and who have known how cunningly to manipulate men's minds; and in the end they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon sincerity.

Therefore, you must know that there are two modes of fighting: one in accordance with the laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts. But because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second: therefore, a prince must know how to make good use of the natures of both the beast and the man. This rule was taught to princes symbolically by the writers of antiquity: they recounted how Achilles and many others of those ancient princes were given to Chiron the centaur to be raised and cared for under his discipline. This can only mean that, having a half-beast and half-man as a teacher, a prince must know how to employ the nature of the one and the other; for the one without the other is not lasting.

Since, then, a prince must know how to make use of the nature of the beast, he should choose from among the beasts the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot defend itself from traps, while the fox cannot protect itself from the wolves. It is therefore necessary to be a fox, in order to recognize the traps, and a lion, in order to frighten the wolves: those who base their behaviour only on the lion do not understand things. A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are removed. If men were all good, this precept would not be good. But since men are a wicked lot and will not keep their promises to you, you likewise need not keep yours to them. A prince never lacks legitimate reasons to colour over his failure to keep his word. Of this, one could cite an endless number of modern examples to show how many pacts and how many promises have been made null and void because of the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to use the ways of the fox has come out best. But it is necessary to know how to colour over this nature effectively, and to be a great pretender and dissembler. Men are so simple-minded and so controlled by their immediate needs that he who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived.

[...]

integrità

1) question

2) the 2 natures

è necessario sapere bene usare la bestia e lo uomo.

also Cheiron or Kheiron (→ hand)

3) la volpe et il liono

Uno signore prudente

li fornì contro a lui est contraria (l'inclination)

la infidelità

→ fede

observerebbero ⇒ conditionnel i.e. when fortune changes

Extract 17

essere gran simulatore e dissimulatore

legittime da colorire la inobservanza

humans are controlled by their appetites?

intelligence of the fox (traps) ≠ intelligence of humans (laws) → + language + logic

être fidèle, c'est tenir parole, sa foi, mais alors tout dépend de quelle foi l'on parle; ainsi "être fidèle" intransitif est-il vide de sens

aggirare ≈ contourner, circonvenir ≈ bypass

con le legge ≈ par les lois

traps / laws

observer la fede quando tale osservanza

ma perché sono tristi

→ infelices?

renvoie dussé à la VIE NUE, la précarité de l'existence

e cervelli delli uomini lo intende

astuzia

realtà ≈ loyauté? (Fournel Zancovini) → ceux qui se sont fondés (appuyés) sur sa réalité (des cerveaux!)

alle necessità presenti

tanto semplici

[XV - XVIII] same arguments concerning to be and to appear

* link with Plato's
allegory of the cave

XVIII

How a prince should keep his word

[...]

Therefore, it is not necessary for a prince to possess all of the above-mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary for him to appear to possess them. Furthermore, I shall dare to assert this: that having them and always observing them is harmful, but appearing to observe them is useful: for instance, to appear merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, religious, and to be so; but with his mind disposed in such a way that, should it become necessary not to be so, he will be able and know how to change to the opposite. One must understand this: a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, because in order to maintain the state he must often act against his faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And so it is necessary that he should have a mind ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changing circumstances command him. And, as I said above, he should not depart from the good if it is possible to do so, but he should know how to enter into evil when forced by necessity.

1) summary

cf. ch. XV

Therefore, a prince must be very careful never to let anything fall from his lips that is not imbued with the five qualities mentioned above; to those seeing and hearing him, he should appear to be all mercy, all faithfulness, all integrity, all humanity, and all religion. And there is nothing more necessary than to seem to possess this last quality. Men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands: everyone can see, but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be, few touch upon what you are, and those few do not dare to contradict the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the state to defend them. In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no tribunal to which to appeal, one must consider the final result. *si guarda al fine mezzo*

2) the end

RELIGION

→ prudence!
→ the people do believe
ognuno / pochi

Therefore, let a prince conquer and maintain the state, and his methods will always be judged honourable and praised by all. For ordinary people are always taken in by appearances and by the outcome of an event. And in the world there are only ordinary people; and the few have no place, while the many have a spot on which to lean. A certain prince of the present times, whom it is best not to name, preaches nothing but peace and faith, and to both one and the other he is extremely hostile. If he had observed both peace and faith, he would have had either his reputation or his state taken away from him many times over.

el vulgo / pochi

Ferdinand II?
a pope?

"e nel mondo non è se non vulgo" → principe de réalité

"con quello che pare e con lo evento della cosa"

⇒ it is not up to the few to judge, but to the many, since all are part of the many when looking at the outcome
⇒ communauté de l'advenu

Extract 18

Gf. Discours, I, 9:

« Un esprit sage ne condamnera jamais quelqu'un pour avoir usé d'un moyen hors des règles ordinaires pour régler une monarchie ou fonder une république. Ce qui est désiré, c'est que si le fait l'accuse, le résultat l'excuse; si le résultat est bon, il est acquitté. »

cf. ch. ~~XX~~ "the best fortress that exists is not to be hated by the people"

XIX

Of avoiding being despised and hated

sotto queste generalità

But since I have spoken about the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I should like to discuss the others briefly under this general rule: that the prince, as was noted above, should concentrate upon avoiding those things that make him hated and contemptible. When he has avoided this, he will have carried out his duties, and none of his other infamous deeds will cause him any danger at all. As I have said, what makes him hated above all else is being rapacious and a usurper of the property and the women of his subjects. He must refrain from this. In most cases, so long as you do not deprive them of either their honour or their property, most men live content, and you only have to contend with the ambition of the few, who can be restrained without difficulty and by many means. What makes him despised is being considered changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. From these qualities, a prince must guard himself as if from a reef, and he must strive to make everyone recognize in his actions greatness, spirit, dignity, and strength. Concerning the private affairs of his subjects, he must insist that his decisions be irrevocable. And he should maintain this reputation in such a way that no man can imagine he is able to deceive or trick him.

That prince who creates such an opinion of himself has a great reputation; and it is difficult to conspire against a man with such a reputation and difficult to attack him, provided that he is understood to be of great ability and revered by his subjects. For a prince should have two fears: one internal, concerning his subjects; the other external, concerning foreign powers. From the latter, he can defend himself by his effective arms and his effective allies, and he will always have effective allies if he has effective arms. Internal affairs will always be stable when external affairs are stable, provided that they are not already disturbed by a conspiracy. And even if external conditions change, if he is properly organized and lives as I have said, and does not lose control of himself, he will always be able to withstand every attack, just as I said that Nabis the Spartan did.

[...]

a diplomat's bias?

Then, on conspiracies:

"One of the most powerful remedies a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by the people, for whoever plans a conspiracy always believes that he will satisfy the people by killing the prince."

"Experience demonstrates that there have been many conspiracies, but that few had a good end."

fuggire

*vario, leggiere,
effeminato,
pusillanimità,
irrisoluto*

→ appearance

*debbba avere
dua paure*

cf. ch. XII

*"where good armies
exist there must
be good laws"*

*« Selon nous, le chapitre XIX
n'est ni un "sommets" [L. Strauss]
ni un appendice secondaire (...)
il est significatif de la structure
même de l'ouvrage qui conduit
à revenir sur des sujets déjà abordés
pour multiplier les angles de vue
sur une même question afin
d'approcher, par approximations
successives, la formulation de
règles qui ne sont jamais absolues. »*

cf. Discourses III, 6

Extract 19

Fournier
et Zancarini,
PUF p. 317

Of avoiding being despised and hated

[...]

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus or Macrinus or Julian, who were immediately wiped out since they were universally contemptible. But I shall come to the conclusion of this discourse. Let me say that the princes of our times, in their governance, suffer less from this problem of satisfying their soldiers by extraordinary means. Although they have to consider them to some extent, yet they resolve the question quickly, for none of these princes has standing armies that have evolved along with the government and the administration of their territory, as did the armies of the Roman Empire. And therefore, if it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers more than the people, that was because the soldiers could do more than the people. Now it is more necessary for all princes, except the Turk and the Sultan, to satisfy the people more than the soldiers, since the people can do more than the soldiers. I make an exception of the Turk, for he always maintains near him twelve thousand infantrymen and fifteen thousand cavalrymen, upon whom depend the safety and the strength of his kingdom, and it is necessary that this ruler should maintain them as his allies, setting aside all other concerns. Likewise, as the kingdom of the Sultan lies entirely in the hands of the soldiers, it is fitting that he too should maintain them as his allies, without considering the people. And you must note that this state of the Sultan is unlike all the other principalities, since it is similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary principality or a new principality. For it is not the sons of the old prince who are the heirs and then become its rulers, but rather the one who is elected to that rank by those who have the authority to do so. Because this institution is an ancient one, it cannot be called a new principality. In it are none of those difficulties that are encountered in new ones, for although the prince is new, the institutions of that state are old and are organized to receive him as if he were their hereditary ruler.

[...]

// citizen soldiers

satisfare
a' populi che
a' soldatiAlso a question
of scalability:
a small
Republic
cannot be
organized in
the same way
as a large
empire.example (as
an exception)
of the kingdom
of the Sultan
// ecclesiastical
principality
ch. XI

What means "can do more"?

Machiavelli has been called by some one of the first
thinkers of the masses — but about whom is he
speaking when he speaks of "the people"?→ the english "people" might be misleading, since
here Machiavelli uses a plural ("populi")

→ français: les peuples

→ plusieurs parts de population

↳ mutation in the social organization:

Florence in 1513 is closer to the Roman Republic
than of the Roman Empire. The latter has a professional
army, while the former has a militia (citizen-soldiers)
who would fight for necessity, not so much for glory, except
within the cage of nationalism.

XX

Of whether fortresses and many things that princes
employ every day are useful or harmful

[...]

Our ancestors and those who were considered wise used to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses. Because of this, they would encourage factional strife in some of their subject towns in order to control them more easily. During those times when Italy enjoyed a balance of power to a certain extent, this advice may have been a good policy. But I do not believe that it can be given as a rule today, since I do not think that factions ever did any good. On the contrary, when the enemy approaches, divided cities are always immediately lost. The weaker factions will always join the external forces, and the others will not be able to stand up to them. Moved by the reasons stated above, I believe, the Venetians encouraged the Guelf and Ghibelline sects in their subject cities. Although they never permitted matters to come to bloodshed, they still fostered these quarrels between them so that those citizens would not unite against them, being busy with their own disputes. As we have seen, this policy did not turn out as they had planned. For after their defeat at Vailà, one faction of these cities was immediately emboldened and seized the entire territory from them. Methods such as these, moreover, are signs of weakness in a prince. In a strong principality such factions will never be allowed, since they are profitable only in peacetime, allowing the subjects to be more easily manipulated by such means; but when war comes, such arrangements reveal their fallacious nature.

Without a doubt, princes become great when they overcome difficulties and obstacles imposed upon them. And therefore, Fortune— especially when she wishes to increase the reputation of a new prince, who has a greater need to acquire reputation than a hereditary prince does—creates enemies for him, and has them undertake enterprises against him so that he will have the chance to overcome them and to climb higher up the ladder his enemies have brought him. Thus, many people judge that a wise prince must cunningly foster some hostile action, whenever he has the opportunity, so that in repressing it his greatness will emerge all the more.

[...]

changing
circumstances

mai

war reveals

→ high intensity
+ open world
perspective
(≠ local closed
perspective)

mostra simile
ordine la
fallacia sua.

personification?
→ inter-potential
response

— sapere più ab.

↑ nourish
enmity (end)
≠ foster hostile
action (mean)

la occasione

notarsi con astuzia
qualche inimicizia

// "What does not kill you
makes you stronger" NIETZSCHE

e però la fortuna [...]
gli fa nascere de' nimici
→ "generates enemies before him"

From an observation (of nature), to the evocation
of lucky circumstantial events (Fortuna, as an
element of nature + ambiguity about its intentionality),
to the necessity to create one own's luck through
a disposition (active) of circumstances (inimicizia)

XXI

How a prince should act to acquire esteem

quanto fanno le grande imprese e dare di sé rari esempi.

Nothing makes a prince more esteemed than great undertakings and showing himself to be extraordinary. In our own times we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. This man can be called almost a new prince, since from being a weak ruler, through fame and glory he became the first king of Christendom. If you consider his deeds you will find them all very grand, and some even extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and that enterprise was the basis of his state. First, he acted while things were peaceful and when he had no fear of opposition. He kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied with this, so that, concentrating on that war, they did not consider rebellion. In this way he acquired reputation and dominion over them without their noticing it. He was able to maintain armies with money from the Church and the people, and through that long war he laid a basis for his own army, which has since brought him honour. Besides this, in order to be able to undertake great enterprises, he had recourse to a pious cruelty, always employing religion for his own purposes, chasing the Marranos out of his kingdom and seizing their property. No example of his actions could be more pathetic or more extraordinary than this. He attacked Africa under the same cloak of religion. He undertook the invasion of Italy. Lately, he attacked France. And thus he has always accomplished and organized great deeds, that have always kept the minds of his subjects surprised, amazed, and occupied with their outcome. One action of his would spring from another in such a way that, between one and the other, he would never give men enough time to be able to work calmly against him.

It also helps a prince a great deal to show himself to be extraordinary in dealing with internal affairs, as in the reports about Messer Bernabò Visconti of Milan. When the occasion arises that a person in public life performs some extraordinary act, be it good or evil, the prince should find a way of rewarding or punishing him that will provoke a great deal of discussion. And above all, a prince should strive in all of his actions to achieve the reputation of a great man of outstanding intelligence.

[...]

A prince should also demonstrate that he is a lover of the virtues, by giving hospitality to virtuous men and by honouring those who excel in a particular skill. Furthermore, he should encourage his subjects to pursue their trades in tranquillity, whether in commerce, agriculture, or in any other human pursuit. No one should be afraid to increase his property for fear that it will be taken away from him, while no one should shrink from undertaking any business through fear of taxes. Instead, the prince must establish rewards for those who wish to do these things, and for anyone who seeks in any way to enrich his city or state. Besides this, at the appropriate times of the year he should keep the populace occupied with festivals and spectacles. And because each city is divided into guilds or neighbourhoods, he should take account of these groups, meet with them on occasion, and offer himself as an example of humanity and munificence while always, nevertheless, firmly maintaining the majesty of his dignity.

cf. Cosimo the elder? Lorenzo?

Example of Ferdinand II

sotto questo modesto mantello

sempre tenuti sospesi et ammirati gli animi de' subditi, et occupati nello evento di esse.

cf. ch. XVIII

patron of the arts

the liberal prince

"politique spectacle"

Spanish Jews converted to catholicism and persecuted (XVc)

politics of attention // perspective of the Shock doctrine

XXII

Of the prince's private secretaries

2 The selection of ministers is of no little importance to a prince; and they are
3 good or not, according to the prince's prudence. The first thing one does to
4 evaluate a ruler's prudence is to look at the men he has around him. When they
5 are capable and loyal, one can always consider him wise, for he has known how to
6 recognize their capacities and to keep them loyal; but when they are otherwise,
7 one can always form a negative judgement of him, for the first error he makes is
8 made in this selection.

9 There was no one who knew Messer Antonio da Venafo, minister to
10 Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not judge Pandolfo to be a very
11 worthy man for having him as his minister. There are three kinds of intelligence:
12 one understands on its own; the second discerns what others understand; and
13 the third neither understands by itself nor through others. The first kind is most
14 excellent, the second is excellent, and the third is useless. Therefore, it must have
15 been the case that if Pandolfo's intelligence was not of the first rank, it had to be
16 of the second; for whenever a man has the intelligence to recognize the good or
17 evil that another man does and says, although he may not have such capacities
18 himself, he recognizes the good and the sorry deeds of his minister, and praises
19 the former and corrects the others; and the minister cannot hope to trick him,
20 and so continues to act well.

21 But as to how a prince may recognize such a minister, there is this method
22 that never fails. When you see that the minister thinks more about himself than
23 about you, and that in all his deeds he seeks out his own interests, such a man as
24 this will never be a good minister, and you will never be able to trust him.

[...]

//with Plato's winged chariot allegory:

- 1/ the chariotteers \equiv reason
- 2/ the white horse \equiv fumes
- 3/ the black horse \equiv appetites

quando tu vedi el ministro
pensare più a sè che a te,
e che in tutte le sue
actioni vi ricerca dentro
l'utile suo, questo tale
così fatto mai fia buono
ministro, mai te ne
potrai fidare.

XXIII

Of how to avoid flatterers

I do not wish to omit an important issue, and an error from which princes protect themselves with difficulty if they are not extremely prudent, or if they do not make good choices. And these are the flatterers, of which the courts are full. Because men delight so much in their own concerns, deceiving themselves in this way, that they find it difficult to protect themselves from this pestilence; while wishing to defend oneself from it brings the danger of becoming despised. For there is no other way to guard yourself against flattery than by making men understand that by telling you the truth they will not injure you. But when anyone can tell you the truth, you lose respect. Therefore, a prudent prince should follow a third course, electing wise men for his state and giving only them permission to speak truthfully to him, and only on such matters as he asks them about and not on other subjects. But he should ask them about everything and should listen to their opinions, and afterwards he should deliberate by himself in his own way. And in such councils, and with each of his ministers, he should conduct himself in such a way that all will realize that the more freely they speak, the more they will please him. Apart from these, he should refuse to listen to anyone else, pursue his goals directly, and be obstinate in the decisions he has taken. Anyone who does otherwise either comes to ruin because of the flatterer, or keeps changing his mind in the face of different opinions; resulting in a low estimation of his worth.

[...]

Therefore, a prince should always seek advice, but when he wants to, and not when others wish it. On the contrary, he should discourage anyone from giving him advice unless he asks for it. But he should be a very frequent questioner, and then, concerning the matters inquired about, a patient listener to the truth. Indeed, if he learns that anyone, for any reason, is reluctant to speak to him, this should worry him. Although many feel that any prince who is considered prudent is reputed to be so not because of his own nature but because of the good counsellors he has around him, without a doubt they are deceived. For this is a general rule that never fails: a prince who is not wise on his own cannot be well advised, unless by chance he has submitted himself to a single person who governs him in everything and who is a most prudent man. In this case he could be well advised, but this would not last long, because such a governor would very soon take the state away from him. But if he seeks advice from more than one counsellor, a prince who is not wise will never have consistent advice, nor will he know how to make it consistent by himself. Each of his advisers will think about his own interests; the prince will not know either how to correct them or recognize them. One cannot find advisers who are any different, for men always turn out bad for you, unless some necessity makes them act well. Therefore, it is to be concluded that good advice, from whomever it may come, must arise from the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince from good advice.

the danger
& the weakness→ selection
+ limitation
(get the best
and avoid
the worst)paziente
auditor
del verocf.
ch. XXII
⇒ "wise"
(savio) can
be said of
the capacity
to listen
+ that of
selecting
well your
advisers

additional element for the selection of advisers:
they must have an interest to remain loyal
(either out of virtue, either out of appetites?)

XXV

Of Fortune's power in human affairs and how she can be resisted

100% : dalla fortuna e da Dio

I am not unaware that many have held, and do still hold, the opinion that the affairs of this world are controlled by Fortune and by God, that men cannot control them with their prudence, and that, on the contrary, men can have no remedy whatsoever for them. For this reason, they might judge that it is useless to lose much sweat over such matters, and let them be controlled by fate. This opinion has been held all the more in our own times because of the enormous upheavals that have been observed and are being observed every day— events beyond human conjecture. When I have thought about it, sometimes I am inclined to a certain degree towards their opinion. Nevertheless, in order not to wipe out our free will, I consider it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, but that she still leaves the control of the other half, or almost that, to us. I compare her to one of those destructive rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and buildings, raising the earth from one spot and dropping it onto another. Everyone flees before it; everyone yields to its impetus, unable to oppose it in any way. But although rivers are like this, it does not mean that we cannot take precautions with dikes and dams when the weather is calm, so that when they rise up again either the waters will be channelled off or their force will be neither so damaging nor so out of control. The same things occur where Fortune is concerned. She shows her power where there is no well-ordered virtue to resist her, and therefore turns her impetus towards where she knows no dikes and dams have been constructed to hold her in. If you consider Italy, the seat of these upheavals and the area which has set them in motion, you will see a countryside without dikes and without a single dam: if Italy had been protected with proper virtue, as is the case in Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would not have produced the enormous upheavals that it has, or it would not have struck here at all. And with this I consider I have said enough about resisting Fortune in general.

[...]

opinion of the time,

DANGER: FATALISM

≈ powerlessness

Nondimanco!

50% : Fortune
~50% : us

metaphor of the furious rivers
(fiumi rovinosi → that bring ruin)

dove non è ordinata virtù a resistere

... quanto allo opporsi alla fortuna, in universalità.
to oppose oneself

* iudico potere essere vero che la fortuna sia arbitra della metà delle azioni nostre, ma che etiam lei ne lasci governare l'altra metà, o presso, a noi.

→ I judge [estimate] that it can be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, but that [thus] she leaves to us to govern the other half, or almost that.

⇒ fortuna is neutral = arbiter // Balance in the zodiac
→ does "this" action fall on that or that side? two-faced while we [can] govern, but this stance is up to us
(we do not know for sure, therefore metaphysics are up to us)

PHILOSOPHY
OF ACTION

variazione grande

perché il nostro libero arbitrio non sia spento

Stoicist argument: do what is in your power, adapt to what is not

"o presso": it is best to consider that we have a bit less than half, so as to stay alert

XXV

Of Fortune's power in human affairs and how she can be resisted

[...]

Restricting myself more to particulars, let me say that one sees a prince prospering today and coming to ruin tomorrow without having seen him change his nature or his qualities. I believe this happens first because of the causes that have been discussed at length earlier. That is, that the prince who relies completely upon Fortune will come to ruin as soon as she changes. I also believe that the man who adapts his method of procedure to the nature of the times will prosper, and likewise, that the man who establishes his procedures out of tune with the times will come to grief. We can observe in the affairs that lead them to the end they seek— that is, towards glory and wealth— that men proceed in different ways: one man with caution, another with impetuosity; one with violence, another with astuteness; one with patience, another with its opposite. Each may achieve his goals with these different means. In the case of two cautious men, we also see that one reaches his goal while the other does not. And likewise, two men prosper equally employing two different means, one being cautious and the other impetuous. This occurs from nothing other than from the quality of the times, that either match or do not match their procedures. This follows from what I said: two men acting differently can reach the same result; and of two men acting identically, one reaches his goal and the other does not. On this also depends the variation of the good, for if a man governs himself with caution and patience, while the times and circumstances are turning in such a way that his conduct is appropriate, he will prosper. But if the times and circumstances change he will be ruined, because he does not change his method of procedure. No man is so prudent that he knows how to adapt himself to this fact, both because he cannot deviate from that to which he is by nature inclined, and also because he cannot be persuaded to depart from a path after having always prospered by following it. And therefore, when it is time to act impetuously the cautious man does not know how to do so, and is ruined as a result; for if he had changed his conduct with the times, Fortune would not have changed.

[...]

la qualità de' tempi

la variazione del bene

non si può deviare da quello a che la natura lo inclina

Ptolémée:

"Les étoiles inclinent mais ne déterminent pas."

VIR SAPIENS DOMINABITUR ASTRIS
"The wise man will overcome the stars"
(cf. Centiloquium)

"andare dritto alla verità effettuale della cosa" (XV)
→ not straight to it, but in its wake
→ what has happened (italian: evento) creates MOMENTUM

Epictetus

Aristotle's ethos

the example of two men

daimon

ethos

Plato

Of Fortune's power in human affairs and how she
can be resisted

[...]

Pope Julius II acted impetuously in all his affairs, and he found the times and circumstances so suitable to this method of procedure that he always achieved felicitous results. Consider the first campaign he waged against Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive. The Venetians were unhappy about it and so was the King of Spain. Julius still had negotiations going on about it with France. Nevertheless, he started personally on this expedition with his usual ferocity and impetuosity. Such a move astonished Spain and the Venetians and stopped them in their tracks, the latter out of fear and the former out of a desire to recover the entire Kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, Julius involved the King of France, for when the King saw him move, and wishing to make him his ally in order to defeat the Venetians, the King decided that he could not deny the Pope the use of his troops without openly injuring him. Therefore, with his impetuous move, Julius accomplished what no other pontiff would ever have achieved with the greatest of human prudence. For if he had waited until he could leave Rome with agreements settled and everything in order, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded, because the King of France would have found a thousand excuses and the others would have aroused in him a thousand fears. I wish to leave unmentioned the other deeds of his, since all were similar and all succeeded well. The brevity of his life did not allow him to experience the contrary; since if times that required proceeding with caution had arrived, his ruin would have followed, for he would never have deviated from those methods to which his nature inclined him. *variando la fortuna' tempi*

I therefore conclude that, since Fortune varies and men remain obstinate in their ways, men prosper when the two are in harmony and fail to prosper when they are not in accord. I certainly believe this: that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and if you want to keep her under it is necessary to beat her and force her down. It is clear that she more often allows herself to be won over by impetuous men than by those who proceed coldly. And so, like a woman, Fortune is always the friend of young men, for they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity.

example
of Julius II

Aristotle's
golden
mean

conclusion

concordano
insieme

→ if you
don't do
anything,
nothing
will
happen?

#prudence

nature // femme
→ aller au rapport de
force, MAIS sous
l'égide de la
CONCORDE

Io giudico bene questo, che sia meglio
essere impetuoso che rispettivo
perché la fortuna è donna
et è necessario, volendola tenere sotto,
batterla et uitarla.

[...] e però sempre, come donna,
è amica de' giovani, perché sono meno
rispettivi, più feroci e con più audacia
la comandano.

XXVI

An exhortation to seize Italy and to free her from the barbarians

Therefore, considering all of the matters discussed above, and wondering to myself whether at present in Italy the times are suitable to honour a new prince, and if there is the material that might give a prudent and virtuous prince the opportunity to introduce a form that would do him honour and bring benefit to the people of Italy, it seems to me that so many circumstances are favourable to such a new prince that I know of no other time more appropriate to this. And if, as I said, it was necessary for the people of Israel to be enslaved in Egypt to make known the virtue of Moses, and it was necessary for the Persians to be oppressed by the Medes to make known the greatness of spirit in Cyrus, and it was necessary for the Athenians to be scattered to make known the excellence of Theseus, then at present, to make known the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary for Italy to be reduced to her present conditions, and that she be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians: without a leader, without order, beaten, despoiled, ripped apart, overrun, and having suffered every sort of ruin.

And even though, before now, some glimmer of light may have shown itself in a single individual, so that it was possible to believe that God had ordained him for Italy's redemption, yet afterwards it was seen how, at the height of his deeds, he was rejected by Fortune. Now Italy, left as if lifeless, awaits the man who may heal her wounds and put an end to the plundering of Lombardy, the extortions in the Kingdom of Naples and in Tuscany, and who can cure her of those sores that have been festering for so long. Look how she now prays to God to send someone to redeem her from these barbaric cruelties and insults. See how ready and willing she is to follow a banner, provided that someone picks it up. Nor is there anyone in sight, at present, in whom she can have more hope than in Your Illustrious House, which, with its fortune and virtue, favoured by God and by the Church, of which it is now prince, could place itself at the head of this redemption. This will not be very difficult if you keep before your eyes the deeds and the lives of those named above. Although those men were rare and marvellous, they were nevertheless men, and each of them had poorer opportunities than are offered now: for their undertakings were no more just, nor easier than this one, nor was God more a friend to them than to you. This is a righteous cause: 'iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est' ['Only those wars that are necessary are just, and arms are sacred when there is no hope except through arms']. Here circumstances are very favourable, and where circumstances are favourable there cannot be great difficulty, provided that you imitate the institutions of those men I have proposed as your target. Besides this, we now see here extraordinary, unprecedented signs brought about by God: the sea has opened up; a cloud has shown you the path; the rock has poured water forth; here manna has rained; everything has converged for your greatness. The rest you must do yourself. God does not wish to do everything, in order not to take from us our free will and part of the glory that is ours.

[...]

cf. ch. VI

* cf. ch. XX: "Without a doubt, princes become great when they overcome difficulties and obstacles imposed upon them."

XXVI

An exhortation to seize Italy and to free her from the barbarians

[...]

la illustre Casa vostra

Therefore, if Your Illustrious House desires to follow these excellent men who redeemed their countries, it is necessary before all else, and as a true basis for every enterprise, to provide yourself with your own soldiers, for one cannot have more loyal, or truer, or better soldiers. Although each one of them may be good individually, united together they will become even better, when they see themselves commanded, honoured, and well treated by their own prince. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare yourself with such soldiers as these, so that with Italian virtue, you will be able to defend yourself against foreigners. Although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered terrifying, nevertheless both have defects, so that a third kind of military organization could not only oppose them but also be confident of overcoming them. For the Spanish cannot withstand cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear infantry, when they discover those who are as stubborn in combat as they are. Therefore, it has been seen, and experience will show, that the Spanish cannot withstand French cavalry and that Spanish infantrymen can destroy the Swiss. Although this last weakness has not yet been seen, there was nevertheless a taste of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry met the German battalions that employ the same order of battle as the Swiss. Aided by bucklers and their own agility, the Spanish got in between and underneath the Germans' long pikes and were able to hurt them at their pleasure, without the Germans having any remedy. And had it not been for the cavalry charge that broke them, the Spaniards would have slaughtered them all. Therefore, as the defects of both these kinds of infantry are recognized, a new type can be organized that is able to withstand cavalry and has no fear of foot-soldiers. This will occur with the way the armed forces are created and a change in the order of battle. These are among those matters that, from their novel organization, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.

→ prudence

cf. Dell'arte della guerra [1520]
→ le métier des armes

This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass by, so that Italy may behold her redeemer after so long a time. Nor can I express with what love he will be received in all those territories that have suffered through these foreign floods; with what thirst for revenge, with what stubborn loyalty, with what devotion, with what tears! What doors will be closed to him? What people will deny him their obedience? What envy could oppose him? What Italian could deny him homage? This barbarian dominion stinks in everyone's nostrils! Therefore, may Your Illustrious House take up this task with the spirit and the hope with which just enterprises are begun, so that under your banner this country may be ennobled, and under your auspices those words of Petrarch may come true:

amore
"illusioni esterne"
cf. ch. XV
→ the furious rivers of Fortuna

Virtue will seize arms
Against frenzy, and the battle will be brief:
For ancient valour
Is not yet dead in Italian hearts.

→ virtù vs. fortuna
→ reference to ancient Rome (Republic)

Virtù contro a furor
prenderà l'armi, e fia el combatter corto,
che l'antico valore
nelli italici cor non è ancor morto.

redemptore

AFFECTS

le imprese iuste

questa occasione